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DEAR JUSTICE WHITE 
Carl Tobias* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congratulations on your selection as Chair of the Commission on 
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals that the United 
States Congress recently authorized. 1 The Commission has a valuable 
opportunity to evaluate the intermediate appellate courts and make 
constructive recommendations for improvement at an important time for the 
circuits. These courts' burgeoning dockets and insufficient resources now 
threaten appellate justice. 
When the House-Senate Appropriations Conference Committee crafted 
the compromise which created the Commission, its members made two 
astute decisions. First, Congress recognized that the circuits are 
experiencing a "crisis of volume" which warrants serious scrutiny by an 
expert, independent entity. Second, senators and representatives rejected an 
ill-advised proposal to split the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 2 This suggestion would have afforded neither the existing Ninth 
Circuit nor the appellate system any overall advantage because the identical 
complement of judges would have been treating the same total number of 
cases. Indeed, the recommendation's unbalanced distribution of judgeships 
and appeals would have exacerbated the current Ninth Circuit's situation. 
Most salient, the measure would have required that members of the new 
Twelfth Circuit resolve fifty-percent fewer cases annually than judges of the 
projected Ninth Circuit, thus complicating the proposed Ninth Circuit's 
efforts to conclude appeals promptly, efficaciously and equitably. Finally, 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I 
wish to thank Tom Baker, Rick Bales and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecilia Palmer 
and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing 
support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See Members Named to Commission, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1998, at l; see also 
Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, Ill Stat. 2440, 2491-92 (1997) (reprinted at 28 
U.S.C.A. § 41 (1997) (historical and statutory notes)). I submitted these ideas to the Commission 
in May, 1998. 
2. See S. 1022, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997). 
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the suggestion would simply have ignored the circumstances of the 
remaining appellate courts. 
Unfortunately, the legislation whkh established the Commission was also 
flawed in two major respects. First, Congress assigned the Commission an 
ambiguous mandate. The charge to "study the present division of the United 
States into the several judicial circuits [and] ... the structure and alignment 
of the Federal Court of Appeals system, with particular reference to the 
Ninth Circuit, "3 left unclear exactly how much emphasis this court should 
receive. Every circuit has encountered expanding dockets; however, the 
courts differ significantly in terms of caseload size, complexity and growth 
rates as well as resources for addressing appeals. All of the appellate courts 
have applied creative, diverse measures that are intended to expedite cases 
but maintain effective and fair resolution, while they have realized varying 
degrees of success. The Ninth Circuit has ambitiously experimented with the 
broadest spectrum of devices, numerous of which have offered substantial 
benefits. These factors mean that the court might well be deciding appeals 
as promptly, efficaciously and equitably as a number of other circuits and 
deserves Commission consideration more as a solution than a problem. 
Another difficulty with the statutory mandate was its explicit focus on 
boundary and structural modifications. The command instructed the 
Commission to report "recommendations for such changes in circuit 
boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and 
effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeal, 
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process. "4 
Boundary adjustments essentially reallocate the workload and may disrupt 
precedent and judicial administration. Therefore, the Commission should 
carefully assess a wide range of structural techniques, such as Ninth Circuit 
reliance on bankruptcy appellate panels, many of which have been salutary, 
although the entity must also analyze the mechanisms' potential drawbacks. 
Moreover, the most efficacious measures, including technological 
innovations and increased dependence on court staff, do not alter circuit 
boundaries or structure. Thus, the Commission should flexibly interpret its 
charge to encompass these remedies and should comprehensively survey 
them. 
A second flaw in the compromise which approved the Commission was 
the limited time accorded the entity to complete its apparently daunting task. 
Congress provided the Commission ten months for studying the appeals 
3. § 305, 111 Stat. at 2491. 
4. Id. 
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courts and two months for developing proposals. 5 I, therefore, evaluate the 
difficulties that the circuits confront and canvass possible solutions to suggest 
how the Commission might finish the work most efficiently in the brief 
compass allotted. I propose that the entity restrictively conceptualize its 
assignment and effectively employ the short period by narrowly, but fairly, 
reading the legislative mandate and by applying this command to data, which 
are presently available or which could easily be secured, on how the 
appellate courts are resolving cases. 
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 
There is considerable agreement that substantial growth in the appeals 
which attorneys and parties pursued over the last quarter century and varying 
resources, especially judges, that the circuits had for addressing cases led 
them to invoke a number of responses which conflict or have disparate 
effects. 6 "From July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1992, filings in the courts of 
appeals rose from 13 ,694 to 43 ,481, an increase of 218 % . "7 Lawyers and 
litigants concomitantly sought appellate review of trial judges' decisions at a 
much higher rate perhaps because few disincentives inhibited them. For 
instance, parties appealed one of forty district court determinations in 1945, 
but one of eight in 1989. 8 Congress also expanded the civil and criminal 
jurisdiction of federal courts, but authorized too few additional judgeships to 
keep pace with mounting circuit dockets. The above phenomena led the 
Federal Courts Study Committee to declare during 1990 that the "appellate 
courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the 
institutions they were even a generation ago. "9 
These circumstances prompted the regional circuits to apply numerous, 
inconsistent measures. Today courts differ significantly in the following 
ways: the alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR) which the circuits employ; 
the percentage of three-judge panels that include active members of specific 
5. See id. at 2492; see also H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997) (showing that the House of 
Representatives unanimously accorded the Commission eighteen months to work). 
6. I rely in this paragraph on William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, 
Expediency, ar:zd the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. 
REY. 273, 277-78, 297-339 (1996); Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the 
Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REY. 1264, 1266-75 (1996). See generally THOMAS E. BAKER, 
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994) 
(affording comprehensive analysis of the appeals courts). 
7. JUDITH MCKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 18 (1993). 
8. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITIEE 110 (1990). 
9. Id. at 109. 
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courts; the opportunities which the circuits afford for oral arguments; the en 
bane procedures that courts use; how decisionmakers resolve appeals by 
reviewing briefs, consulting and finalizing determinations; collegiality among 
judges; the time needed to conclude cases; the consistency of judicial 
decisionmaking; the forms which the circuits' determinations assume; the 
restrictions on citation to unpublished dispositions that the courts impose; the 
availability of circuit decisions; and the responsibilities which the courts 
. . . ff 10 assign to circmt sta . 
Burgeoning appellate dockets, disparities in the resources that appeals 
courts possess, and circuits' diverse responses to caseload growth apparently 
comprise inextricably intertwined, and even intractable, problems which defy 
felicitous resolution. However, application of the statutory mandate to 
existing information, and to material that could rather easily be collected, 
analyzed and synthesized, related to appellate courts' treatment of appeals 
should enable the Commission to complete its task in a timely fashion. 
III. ANALYZING PROBLEMS THAT THE APPEALS COURTS MAY BE 
EXPERIENCING 
A. Parsing the Statutory Mandate 
The Commission's authorizing statute instructed it to "study the present 
division of the United States into the several judicial circuits [and] ... the 
structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system, with 
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit" and to report "recommendations 
for such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for 
the expeditious and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal 
Courts of Appeal, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due 
process. " 11 This charge can properly be interpreted as requiring the 
Commission to suggest modifications in boundaries or structure only after it 
10. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 34-36; 9TH CIR. R. 34-36. lOTH CIR. R. 34-36; see also infra 
notes 18-30 and accompanying text. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate 
Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. I (1997) 
(discussing the divergent practices of the circuit courts and suggesting methods to improve 
uniformity). The responses and their effects differ, but judges write fully-reasoned opinions, after 
hearing oral arguments and closely conferring with their colleagues, in a dwindling percentage of 
cases. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 274-78; see also BAKER, supra note 6, at 14-30. 
11. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, Ill Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997) (reprinted at 
28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1997) (historical and statutory notes)). 
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conclusively determines that alterations are necessary for, and will promote, 
the prompt, efficacious and fair resolution of cases. In other words, the 
Commission must first definitively find that specific regional circuits do not 
decide appeals expeditiously, effectively and equitably before considering 
whether boundary or structural adjustments would rectify these three 
phenomena. Even then, the Commission should propose only those changes 
which would clearly foster prompt, efficacious and fair treatment both of 
particular courts' dockets and of the appellate system's caseload without 
imposing substantial disadvantages. 
The statutory mandate apparently contemplated that the Commission 
would attempt to define and measure expeditious, effective and equitable 
resolution in terms of similarly calibrated applicable parameters while 
identifying and allowing for relevant variables. For example, when the 
Commission evaluates speed, it should consult the idea of time to disposition 
calculated from the same starting point, namely filing of the notice of appeal 
or of briefs. When the Commission assesses efficacy and fairness, it might 
consider such factors as how frequently the circuits provide oral arguments 
and published opinions and, when they do so, how carefully judges respond 
to the contentions proffered or explain the results. 12 
The Commission must correspondingly delineate and provide for 
pertinent variables, including dockets' relative complexity, which 
complicated appeals from administrative agency decisionmaking to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit aptly 
epitomize, and the judicial resources that are available for addressing cases, 
which vacancies in one fifth of the Ninth Circuit's authorized judgeships 
illustrate. These factors could skew evaluation, for instance, by masking the 
consumption of additional time or the inefficiencies that judicial openings can 
create; they are variables that the Commission might not otherwise take into 
account. 
Time to disposition as well as the percentages of appeals that receive oral 
arguments and published opinions are closely related, and they are 
informative measures of prompt, effective and equitable resolution. The 
Commission may want to examine additional parameters, but some will resist 
calibration, and their meaning will be even more. difficult to assess. One 
helpful example is the accuracy of substantive decisionmaking, that is, 
12. Oral argument may improve judges' understanding, while opportunities to argue before, 
and receive published opinions from, circuits that can be the courts of last resort may increase 
visibility, accountability and public confidence. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and 
Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 732 (1983); ABA ACTION COMMIITEE TO 
REDUCE COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY 26-27 (1984); see also 
BAKER, supra note 6, at 165-66; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL .. JUSTICE ON APPEAL 1-12 (1976). 
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whether the courts reach appropriate results. The Commission might attempt 
to analyze the records, briefs, oral arguments and determinations in 
particular cases when ascertaining whether judges properly resolve appeals. 
Nevertheless, several phenomena will frustrate this effort. For instance, it is 
virtually impossible to evaluate oral arguments, especially how they 
influence decisionmaking, or to find conclusively that a judgment is correct 
even once the Supreme Court has ruled. 
The Commission could concomitantly consult the rate at which the High 
Court reverses opinions of specific appellate courts. Indeed, senators who 
favor splitting the Ninth Circuit argue that the number and percentage of its 
determinations that the Supreme Court overturns is a compelling reason for 
bifurcation. 13 However, the many variables, some of which are difficult to 
identify, isolate and allow for-such as why attorneys and parties decide to 
appeal, specific Justices' interests and the plethora of Ninth Circuit cases that 
the Court has recently chosen to review-which attend the reversal rate 
complicate attempts to derive reliable conclusions from that statistic. 14 
The statutory mandate's phraseology, which speaks in terms of prompt, 
effective and fair appellate disposition, also encourages comparisons among 
the circuits. Congress apparently envisioned that the Commission would 
first definitively decide that particular courts are not expeditiously, 
efficaciously and equitably addressing appeals-a determination which the 
entity can most confidently make after comparing and finding deficient the 
individual circuit's performance vis-a-vis the remaining courts. Only once 
the Commission conclusively ascertains that specific circuits are failing to 
treat cases promptly, effectively and fairly and that boundary or structural 
alterations would clearly promote expeditious, efficacious and equitable 
resolution and impose no substantial disadvantages, should the entity 
prescribe recommendations for such modifications. 
13. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8044 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Conrad Burns); id. at S8047 (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton). But see ABA Board of Governors 
Working Group on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 6 (Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter 
ABA Resolution]. 
14. See Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Functions Well And Should Not Be Divided, FED. 
LA w., Aug. 1998, at 40; Carl Tobias, Suggestions For Studying The Federal Appellate System, 49 
FLA. L. REV. 189, 225 (1997); see also infra sentence between text accompanying notes 21 and 22 
(suggesting difficulty of assessing meaning even of parameters that can be calibrated). 
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B. Applying the Statutory Mandate: Expeditious, Effective and Fair 
Appellate Resolution 
Several parameters might usefully serve as accurate measures of whether 
particular appellate courts promptly, effectively and fairly decide their 
appeals. One obvious yardstick for speed is time to disposition, although the 
Commission must insure that temporal factors are identically calculated 
while providing for applicable variables, such as case complexity. Recent 
statistics indicate that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits ne.ed greater time to 
address appeals in certain absolute senses. 15 The Commission might attempt 
to ascertain whether the courts actually afford less expeditious treatment and, 
if so, why. For example, the Ninth Circuit concludes cases faster, in terms 
of several measurements, than numerous courts, permits oral arguments 
more frequently than some circuits, and furnishes written, reasoned 
dispositions at a higher rate than most appellate courts. 16 
Instructive parameters for determining whether regional circuits 
efficaciously and fairly decide appeals are the percentage of counseled cases 
terminated on the merits in which courts hear oral arguments and the 
percentage of counseled appeals resolved on the merits in which circuits 
issue published opinions. The Commission might consult applicable 
empirical data by, for instance, considering those courts that compiled 
percentages which were below the national average in the 1997 fiscal year. 
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits failed to attain that 
average for either oral arguments or published opinions; however, the Ninth 
and Fifth Circuits more closely approached it for oral arguments and 
published opinions respectively. 17 The Commission should also attempt to 
adjust for relevant variables and to discern whether the five courts in fact 
provide less effective and equitable resolution by, for example, evaluating 
15. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Median Time Intervals in Cases 
Terminated After Hearing or Submission, by Circuit during the Twelve Month Period Ended Dec. 
31, 1997, Table B4 (I 998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Terminated Cases]. For example, the 
Eleventh Circuit is slowest from tiling notice of appeal to filing last brief, while that court is third. 
and the Ninth Circuit is second, slowest from filing notice of appeal to final disposition. See id. 
16. The court is quickest from submission to final disposition and third quickest from hearing 
to final disposition. See id.; see also NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT 
OF 1995, S. REP. No. 197, at 22 (1995) (affording data on oral arguments and written dispositions) 
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; William W Schwarzer, Statement to the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 1-2 (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 12, 1998) 
<http: //app .comm. uscourts.gov /hearings/newyork/0424SCHW. htm > [hereinafter Schwarzer 
Statement] (analyzing variables). 
17. See Federal Judicial Center, Snapshot of Appeals Terminated in FY 1997 (1998) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Snapshot]. The Ninth Circuit held oral arguments in two, and the Fifth 
Circuit issued published opinions in three, percent fewer cases than the national average. See id. 
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the time which they actually devote to conducting oral arguments and to 
producing published opinions. This material and the data on disposition 
times suggest that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits may 
not decide appeals promptly, efficaciously and fairly today. 
C. Narrowing the Commission Inquiry 
Even if the above information fails to demonstrate with the reqms1te 
certainty that some appellate courts expeditiously, effectively and equitably 
resolve cases, the statistics afford a sufficiently reliable basis for narrowing 
the scope of the Commission's inquiry. For instance, the material on 
disposition times as well as percentages of oral arguments and published 
opinions could support Commission findings that the First, Second, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits were, and that the five remaining 
appellate courts might have been, addressing their appeals promptly, 
efficaciously and fairly at least during fiscal year 1997. However, the 
Commission may want to consider similar data regarding earlier periods, to 
project into the future or to consult additional measures. 
Insofar as the information on time to disposition as well as the 
percentages of oral arguments and published opinions accurately shows that 
regional circuits accord cases expeditious, effective and equitable treatment, 
the material could permit the Commission to limit its work substantially. 
The Commission might first briefly re-evaluate whether any of the five 
appeals courts designated does decide cases promptly, efficaciously and 
fairly, and thus, can be eliminated from consideration, or whether certain 
circuits perform so much better that they could receive relatively little 
attention. For example, the statistics on time to disposition indicate that the 
Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits are addressing appeals expeditiously, even 
as the data on oral arguments and published opinions may demonstrate that 
the courts do not provide effective and equitable resolution. The information 
on oral arguments and on published opinions suggests that the Ninth and 
Fifth Circuits respectively decide cases with comparative efficacy and 
fairness, but the material on time to disposition apparently shows that the 
courts afford rather slow disposition. Therefore, the Commission might, and 
probably should, conclude that the circumstances of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits remain sufficiently unclear that they warrant 
greater analysis, partly because the available information is neither broad nor 
refined enough to support conclusive judgments. 18 Even if the Commission 
18. The Senate Judiciary Committee majority afforded data showing that the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits were more efficient than the Ninth, even as the minority offered equally valid data 
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decides to assess further those five courts, the determination that seven 
regional circuits promptly, effectively and equitably address appeals and, 
accordingly, require minimal additional examination would significantly 
circumscribe the Commission's efforts. 19 
D. Scrutinizing the Five Courts 
When the Commission attempts to ascertain more definitively whether 
these five appellate courts expeditiously, efficaciously and fairly resolve 
cases, it should closely evaluate their actual practices while considering 
parameters other than time to disposition, percentages of oral arguments, and 
published opinions. For instance, the Commission could analyze the 
consequences of the Third Circuit's reliance on judgment orders and the 
choice of the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits not to make their 
unpublished opm1ons available on line. The Commission might 
concomitantly explore how the Eleventh Circuit annually terminates 275 
appeals on the merits per authorized judgeship when the national average is 
155 and assess this disposition rate's impacts on specific cases. 20 Another 
important statistic shows that more than one-sixth of all three-judge panels 
constituted by the court and by the Ninth Circuit include a decisionmaker 
who is not an active member of the particular appellate court. 21 The 
Commission could ask whether reliance on visiting judges promotes inter-
circuit consistency and helpful interchange or whether it increases the 
potential for intracircuit conflicts while imposing expense. Some evidence 
correspondingly suggests that a majority of the Fourth Circuit's judges may 
employ the en bane procedure to reverse panel determinations with which 
they disagree politically. 22 The Commission might want to evaluate these 
showing the opposite. Compare SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 9-10, with Snapshot, supra note 
17. 
19. This is not the only way to narrow the inquiry. while more time to study or more data 
may prove my ideas incorrect. The approach is defensible, given available data and the short time 
for the Commission to complete a potentially enormous task. Indeed, some observers essentially 
argue that no circuits properly resolve appeals and argue for systemic solutions. See, e.g., Judith 
Resnik, Statement Submitted to Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 12, 1998) < http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/newyork 
/0427RES.htm >; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 6. 
20. See Snapshot, supra note 17. This annual rate could be considered a parameter. 
21. See Participation by Visiting Judges in Certain Work of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
1993 Through 1997, Table I (preliminary data); see also id. (showing 153 national average); 
Resnik, supra note 19, at 4 (analyzing visitors' benefits). These data could be considered 
parameters. 
22. See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 
1136 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 721 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, C.J., 
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practices by collecting, analyzing and synthesizing relevant empirical 
evidence, perhaps with surveys and interviews of affected judges, lawyers 
and parties. 
There are actual appellate court practices which the Commission could 
consider in addition to the forms that resolution assumes; the accessibility of 
dispositions; how decisionmakers review briefs, choose whether to hear oral 
arguments, confer and reach determinations; reliance on visiting judges; and 
circuits' employment of the en bane mechanism. These include the 
alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR) that courts use, the collegiality of 
judges, the duties which circuits assign court staff, and the strictures imposed 
on citation of certain dispositions. For example, examination of the local 
circuit rules that apply to ADR, staff deployment, and decisions which 
lawyers may cite, reveals considerable disparity among the appeals courts 
and indicates that some circuits might treat cases less expeditiously, 
efficaciously and fairly than others. However, the Commission must 
definitively ascertain whether this impression, derived from assessing the 
requirements as written, is accurate by scrutinizing the courts' practices. 
Parameters which the Commission could consult, apart from time to 
disposition as well as percentages of oral arguments and published opinions, 
encompass the consistency of intracircuit judicial decisionmaking and the 
reversal rate. For instance, the only systematic study of precedent's 
operation in a large appellate court, the Ninth Circuit, found that the court 
has "generally succeeded in avoiding conflicts between panel decisions. "23 
Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., of the Ninth Circuit recently contended that 
"reversal rate of the cases selected for review by the Supreme Court is not a 
legitimate basis for evaluating the performance of [this appeals court] and is 
certainly no basis for dividing a circuit. "24 Chief Judge Hug argued that the 
court must "resolve more complicated, novel and important issues than other 
circuits," that several appeals courts had higher reversal rates than the Ninth 
Circuit, and that the Supreme Court overturned fewer than one percent of 
the Ninth Circuit's merits terminations during 1996.25 
dissenting from failure to grant rehearing en bane). See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald 
Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-90, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008 (1991); Michael E. Solimine, 
Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29 (1998). 
23. MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 94; see also Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in 
the Law of the Large Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); 
Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and 
Practice of Precedent in the large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 ( 1989). 
24. Hug, supra note 14, at 40. 
25. See id.; see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
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When the Commission evaluates the five appellate courts which might not 
be promptly, effectively and equitably addressing appeals, it should 
remember that there may be multiple acceptable ways to decide cases. For 
example, the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits issue published opinions 
less frequently than the remaining courts and permit oral arguments in a 
significantly smaller percentage of appeals than all except one.26 
Nevertheless, Commission analysis of actual practices might reveal that those 
three circuits are providing cases the treatment which they deserve and, 
therefore, are expeditiously, efficaciously and fairly ·resolving appeals. 
More specifically, pro se litigants pursue most of the cases in which the three 
courts do not afford published opinions and oral arguments,27 thus ~erhaps 
indicating that appeals receive the attention which they warrant. 2 The 
Second Circuit offers another informative illustration. The court's 
production of published opinions in thirty-nine percent of counseled cases 
could suggest that it fails to conclude appeals promptly, effectively and 
equitably. 29 However, this figure is higher than the percentages which seven 
appellate courts compiled, and even were it lower, the Second Circuit's 
provision of oral arguments in eighty-five percent of counseled cases 
apparently compensates by according parties opportunities to persuade, and 
. f d"" k JO receive responses rom, ec1s10nma ers. 
IV. ANALYZING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS THAT THE APPEALS 
COURTS MAY BE EXPERIENCING 
A. An Introductory Comment About Solutions 
If the Commission conclusively determines that any appeals courts are not 
expeditiously, efficaciously and fairly addressing cases, the entity must then 
ascertain whether changes in circuit boundaries or structure would foster 
prompt, effective and equitable treatment of appeals by the courts and the 
appellate system. It should remember that these modifications might fail to 
26. See Snapshot, supra note 17 and accompanying text. The Third, Fourth, Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits hold oral arguments in thirty percent of cases. See id. 
27. See Snapshot, supra note 17. 
28. See Tobias. supra note 6, at 1269-75. But see Resnik, supra note 19; Richman & 
Reynolds, supra note 6, at 280-81, 286, 290, 295. 
29. See Snapshot, supra note 17. 
30. See id.; Jon 0. Newman, Statement to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals 2 (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 12, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts. 
gov/hearings/newyork/0424NEWM.htm > [hereinafter Newman statement]. 
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promote such resolution and that they could impose certain disadvantages, 
including detrimental side effects, which may be difficult to predict. For 
instance, the recommended alterations of the Ninth Circuit that Congress 
recently considered31 certainly would have delayed, and might well have 
permitted less efficacious and fair disposition of the proposed Ninth Circuit's 
caseload, even though the adjustments suggested could have led to 
expeditious, effective and equitable treatment in the projected Twelfth 
Circuit, while disrupting precedent and judicial administration. These 
developments might have materialized principally because the changes would 
have unevenly distributed the docket and judges without authorizing 
additional judicial positions, thus leaving members of the new Ninth Circuit 
to decide fifty-percent more appeals each year than their counterparts on the 
proposed Twelfth Circuit, and would have required duplicative courthouses 
and circuit administrative structures. 32 The Commission, therefore, must 
insure that boundary and structural modifications will clearly facilitate 
prompt, efficacious and fair disposition of the caseload both for specific 
courts and for the appellate system. 
The Judicial Conference concomitantly registered strong concerns about 
adjustments which involve boundaries and structure in the recommendation 
on appeals court size and workload of its 1995 Long Range Plan. 33 The 
Conference suggested that "[c]ircuit restructuring should occur only if 
compelling empirical evidence demonstrates adjudicative or administrative 
dysfunction in a court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and 
coherent, consistent circuit law in the face of increasing workload. "34 The 
Conference urged that "division of a particular circuit or realignment of 
circuit boundaries should continue to be, as it has been historically, an 
infrequent event," admonishing that any reconfiguration proposed "must be 
considered in the light of the disruption of precedent and judicial 
administration that such changes generally entail. "35 The Federal Judicial 
31. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization of 1997, S. 431, 105th Cong.§§ 2-11 
(1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995). 
32. See S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Letter from Procter Hug, 
Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, to Sen. Harry M. Reid (D.-Nev.) (July 18, 
1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S8060 (daily ed. July 24, 1997); see also infra notes 69-73, 80 
and accompanying text. 
33. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 44-45 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. The Conference is the federal courts' 
policy-making arm. 
34. Id. at 44; see also ABA Resolution, supra note 13, at 4 (endorsing as ABA policy). 
35. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 45; see also Letter from Edward R. Becker to 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Jan. 26, 1998) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Becker Letter]. 
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Center, which published a thorough study of the appeals courts in 1993, 
correspondingly found that the circuits and judges were under stress, 
although it was apparently not one which would have been "significantly 
relieved by structural changes to the appellate system at [that] time. "36 
In short, boundary and structural alterations are comparatively dramatic 
approaches to which Congress has rarely resorted, which might· not facilitate 
expeditious, efficacious and equitable resolution and which could entail 
unforeseeable disadvantages, while the analysis above indicates that at least 
seven regional circuits promptly, effectively and fairly address cases. 37 The 
Commission, thus, must first ascertain whether remedies apart from 
boundary modifications would enable particular courts and the appellate 
system to treat appeals as quickly, efficaciously and equitably, with fewer 
detrimental impacts, and should initially consult solutions which would 
directly and narrowly respond to those phenomena that apparently prevent 
expeditious, effective and fair appellate disposition today. 
In other words, the Commission must exhaust limited, circuit-specific 
approaches, which promise to foster prompt, efficacious and equitable 
treatment, but that have minimal adverse effects. For example, the 
authorization of several additional judges or the adoption of many remedies 
for docket growth-solutions which are more modest than creating 
judgeships and less extreme than changing boundaries-may facilitate 
expeditious, effective and fair resolution with little disadvantage. The 
Commission, therefore, should carefully assess numerous circumscribed 
measures which apply to individual appeals courts and definitively determine 
that they will fail to encourage prompt, efficacious and equitable disposition 
or would have deleterious impacts before the entity considers boundary 
alterations. 
Finally, even if the Commission examines adjustments in boundaries or 
structure, it might well conclude that those modifications by themselves will 
simply not facilitate expeditious, effective and fair treatment or would 
impose substantial disadvantages and, accordingly, recommend no boundary 
changes. 38 Illustrative are profosals for splitting the Ninth Circuit which 
Congress recently evaluated. 3 Bifurcating the court alone would have 
afforded no overall or systemic benefit because division would have only 
reallocated the workload with the same contingent of active judges deciding 
the identical quantity of cases and could have disrupted precedent and 
36. MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 155. The Center is the courts' major research arm. 
37. See supra pp. 8-9. 
38. If the Commission so concludes, its mandate suggests that Congress would have intended 
it to propose no such alteration. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
1140 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
judicial administration. 40 Members of the new Twelfth Circuit would have 
annually confronted 239 appeals and the court would have needed redundant 
buildings and personnel, while judges on the proposed Ninth Circuit would 
have faced 363 cases yearly and, thus, this court would have processed 
appeals more slowly, and perhaps less efficaciously and equitably, than 
either the projected Twelfth Circuit or the present Ninth Circuit. 41 Indeed, 
Congress's traditional response to caseload growth of realigning appeals 
courts and authorizing additional judgeships has marginally facilitated 
appellate disposition and seemingly has had some adverse impacts, such as 
the erosion of circuits' federalizing function, that is, the courts' 
responsibility to reconcile the Constitution and national policies with state 
and local interests. 42 
B. "Structural" Solutions Other Than Changes in Circuit Boundaries 
The Commission must first scrutinize, and seriously consider suggesting, 
a broad spectrum of limited solutions, other than circuit boundary 
alterations, which can fairly be characterized as structural.43 The remedies 
may better promote prompt, efficacious and equitable resolution, in part 
because the approaches would apparently be rather simple and easier to 
implement and, therefore, ultimately less disruptive, while these measures 
could specifically and narrowly treat the phenomena which seem to prohibit 
expeditious, effective and fair disposition. 
One such potential solution is subject matter panels of particular appellate 
courts that decide cases in designated substantive fields, including oil and 
gas, an approach which the Fifth Circuit has successfully employed. 44 
Another helpful example is the Bankruptcy Appellate Panels ("BAP") used 
40. See supra notes 32, 35; infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
41. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit's division may have 
minimally improved resolution. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; infra note 67. 
42. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT. LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 3. at 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); 
John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980); see also 
BAKER, supra note 6, at 202 (adding judges ''does not achievi:: any lasting improvement"); supra 
note 35 (recounting more disadvantages); infra note 60 and accompanying text (same). The 
measures assessed are illustrative and are not exhaustively evaluated. At each subsection's 
conclusion, I suggest sources that analyze these measures and others more extensively. 
43. The introductory comment treated structural with boundary changes and characterized 
both as rather extreme. The Commission's authorizing statute expressly prescribes both, although 
many "structural" approaches considered here would be more modest and less disruptive. 
44. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 120-21. See 
generally Stuart Nagel, Systematic Assignment of Judges: A Proposal, 10 JUDICATURE 73 (Aug.-
Sept. 1986) (analyzing panels and a system that factors judges' interests and abilities in case 
assignments). 
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in the Ninth Circuit.45 Congress apparently found the panels' deployment 
sufficiently efficacious to require that all appeals courts institute BAPs or 
justify not implementing them. 46 
A related measure is courts which have national appellate subject matter 
jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
generally afforded specialization's benefits, such as expertise, efficiency and 
enhanced consistency in the identified area of federal law, namely copyright, 
trademark and patents, since its 1982 creation.47 However, the 
circumscribed focus of courts with nationwide subject matter jurisdiction 
contravenes the long-standing tradition of generalist judges, and the tribunals 
may be susceptible to capture by interests which regularly appear before 
them. 48 
Other possibilities are appeals court panels that include fewer than three 
decisionmakers49 or that consist of district judges who are responsible for 
error correction, 50 both of which would conserve the judicial resources of 
appellate courts. Nevertheless, two-judge panels will experience difficulty 
when the members disagree, 51 while panels constituting three district judges 
might be reluctant to overturn rulings of colleagues who occupy identical 
positions in the judicial hierarchy and could include )urists whom Presidents 
appointed primarily for their trial court expertise. 5 A rather provocative 
45. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b) (1994); see also Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel and Its Implications for Adoption of Specialist Panels in the Courts of Appeals, in 
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra nme 23, at 165-91. 
46. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 108 Stat. 4106, 
4109-10; see also LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 47-49. 
47. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 
37-38 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994)). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REY. I (1989) (assessing the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REY. 559 (1992) (same). 
48. See, e.g.' BAKER, supra note 6, at 222; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 120-21; Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral 
Reforms or Efforts to Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 224 (1991). 
49. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 6, at 172; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 131-32; 
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Statement to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals 3-4 (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 11, 1998) < http://app.comm.uscourts.gov 
/hearings/newyork/oscannl.htm >[hereinafter O' Scannlain Statement]. 
50. See, e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 131-32; MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 
133-39. 
51. See, e.g., MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 127-33; Newman Statement, supra note 30, at 3; 
Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1400 (1995). 
52. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 
51 U. MIAMI L. REY. 389, 404 (1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1994) (authorizing district 
judges to sit on appeals courts by designation); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting 
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approach for the Ninth Circuit would keep the circuit intact but have 
multiple divisions of the appeals court comprising the same complement of 
active appellate judges who would be responsible for cases that arise from 
the identical federal districts. 53 This concept would avoid disruption and 
capitalize on certain administrative benefits of retaining the circuit, namely 
expertise and fiscal economies, and ostensibly enable appeals court judges to 
have greater familiarity with the trial judges whose decisions they review. 54 
Once the Commission has thoroughly assessed structural remedies apart 
from boundary changes, the entity must determine whether any of those 
solutions alone or together will enable the regional circuits, which are not 
expeditiously, effectively and fairly treating cases now, and the appellate 
system, to do so with little deleterious effect. If the Commission concludes 
that the remedies would permit such disrosition, it should recommend the 
best : combination of approaches and exclude the courts from further 
consideration. 
C. Non-Structural Solutions 
The same reasons which suggest that the Commission must first examine 
"structural" measures other than modifications in circuit boundaries also 
indicate that the entity should initially canvass, and carefully contemplate 
proffering, many non-structural solutions. 55 One potential problem with 
analyzing and proposing these remedies is that the legislation which 
authorizes the Commission expressly empowers it to recommend "changes in 
circuit boundaries or structure. "56 However, the Commission may find that 
non-structural approaches would facilitate resolution which is as prompt, 
efficacious and equitable as, and less disadvantageous than, boundary 
alterations-thus essentially determining that no "changes in circuit 
boundaries or structure ... may be appropriate for the expeditious [, fair] 
Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on 
The United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 376 (1995). 
53. I am indebted to Judge Pamela Ann Rymer and Professors Paul Carrington and John 
Oakley for this idea. See also Joseph E. Weis, Jr., Statement to the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 4-5 (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 11, 1998) 
< http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/ hearings/newyork/0424WEIS.htm >. 
54. For more analysis of the "structural" measures examined above and evaluation of many 
others, see BAKER, supra note 6, at 215-24, 238-79; MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 105-21; REPORT 
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 118-23. 
55. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text. 
56. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997) (reprinted at 
28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1997) (historical and statutory notes)). 
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and effective disposition of the [appellate] caseload. "57 Congress arguably 
intended that the Commission broadly read "structure" or suggest non-
structural alternatives. 
Two important measures which do not directly implicate structure ate the 
authorization of appellate commissioners and of additional judgeships. 
Appellate commissioners, a concept with which the Ninth Circuit'. has 
recently experimented, 58 might augment existing judicial resources and 
improve disposition by assuming a broad range of responsibilities. For 
example, the officers could expedite rulings on non-dispositive motions and 
on attorney fee requests, might serve as the appeals court analogue of 
magistrate judges or may discharge several tasks, such as case screening, 
issue tracking and opinion drafting, which circuit staff now perform, thereby 
enhancing visibility and accountability. 59 . 
The creation of more judgeships has been one critical component of the 
conventional congressional response to docket growth. Enhanced judicial 
resources could facilitate prompt, efficacious and equitable resolution, 
although some observers assert that expanding the membership of larger 
courts can have adverse consequences, such as decreases in collegiality and 
the consistency of intracircuit decisionmaking. 60 
Reliance on visiting appellate and district judges to staff three-judge 
panels is a practice which is closely related to the authorization of additional 
judgeships and which every court except the District of Columbia Circuit has 
employed. Fifteen percent of judges who presently serve on panels are not 
active members of the specific appeals courts on which they sit. 61 Continued 
and growing dependence on visiting judges may offer some benefits, 
including supplementation of existing judicial resources, potential reductions 
in intercircuit inconsistency, greater diversity and enhanced interaction of 
appellate and district judges within and among appeals courts. 62 However, 
57. Id. 
58. See Hug, supra note 14, at 40; see also BAKER, supra note 6, at 175-76; MCKENNA, 
supra note 7, at 129-33. 
59. See MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 129-33; Hug, supra note 14, at 3. 
60. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 10-11; Jon 0. Newman, /,OOOJudges-The Limit 
For An Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 188 (1993); Gerald B. Tjotlat, More 
Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70-73; see also Tobias, supra note 51, at 1388 
(suggesting Ninth Circuit's 3276 combinations of three-judge panels may have these effects); supra 
note 42 and accompanying text (same). 
61. See supra note 21. 
62. See Resnik, supra note 19. 
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disadvantages, such as possible increases in intracircuit inconsistency and 
. 1 b . d 63 expense mig 1t e impose . 
Another important, albeit controversial, approach would be the 
formalization of discretionary appellate review. The appeals courts have 
esseptially instituted this remedy by restricting the number of oral arguments 
·l• 
and. published opinions afforded and by substantially relying on staff. 
Foqnal recognition of discretionary review would more candidly 
acknowledge certain realities of modern appellate disposition and could 
conserve judicial resources; however, the concept may be unconstitutional 
and would alter appeal of right that has a long, revered history. 64 
The non-structural solutions also include numerous, principally 
procedural, measures which the regional circuits have specifically invoked to 
address expanding dockets. These encompass various alternatives to dispute 
resolution, different en bane practices, diverse case screening and issue 
designation mechanisms, a broad spectrum of technological innovations, the 
placement of enhanced dependence on court staff and additional options as 
discussed above. The Ninth Circuit contends that application of the 
techniques enumerated and many others, such as special provision for long-
range planning and a unique case "weighting" system, has permitted it to 
treat the largest appellate court docket promptly, efficaciously, equitably and 
. l 65 consistent y. 
After the Commission has intensively reviewed a wide range of non-
structural approaches, the entity must ascertain whether any of the remedies 
individually, together, or combined with "structural" solutions, will allow 
the remaining appeals courts, which do not afford expeditious, effective and 
fair disposition, and the appellate system to so decide cases but have minimal 
deleterious impact. Only if the Commission definitively finds that none of 
the measures would facilitate this type of resolution, should it then consider 
boundary alterations. 
63. Visitors are less familiar with circuit law, traditions and active judges and impose travel 
and administrative costs. See BAKER, supra note 6, at 198-201; MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 38-39; 
see also Tobias, supra note 14, at 227 (suggesting other ways to augment resources but recognizing 
more judges and staff may pose above problems or increase bureaucratization). 
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); see also BAKER, supra note 6, at 234-38; Robert M. 
Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for Adopting Discretionary Review in the 
Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. REV. 573, 578-82 (1997); Richman & Reynolds, supra 
note 6, at 277-78. 
65. See JOE S. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (Federal Judicial Center 1985); Hug, supra note 14, at 40; 
Tobias, supra note 14, at 240-41. But see supra notes 10, 19. For more analysis of the "non-
structural" measures examined above and evaluation of many others, see BAKER, supra note 6, at 
108-47, 151-81, 187-214; MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 123-39; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, 
at 131-33. 
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D. Changes in Circuit Boundaries 
Extensive Commission assessment of limited, circuit-specific remedies 
will reveal many that would permit any appeals courts which the entity 
conclusively determines are not promptly, efficaciously and equitably 
addressing cases to do so. If this survey clearly shows that no solutions 
alone or together would enable regional circuits and the appellate system to 
treat appeals as expeditiously, effectively and fairly as, and with fewer 
disadvantages than, modifications in boundaries, the Commission should 
explore boundary changes. 
The Commission could variously approach alterations of boundaries. The 
entity must remember that boundary adjustments by themselves will not 
necessarily foster prompt, efficacious and equitable disposition, and could 
have adverse consequences. For instance, such modifications, without more, 
may essentially reallocate the workload by requiring the identical total 
number of judges to address the same caseload, and the changes could 
disrupt precedent and judicial administration. 66 Recent proposals for 
bifurcating the Ninth Circuit demonstrate, and the operation of the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits, since their 1980 creation from the former Fifth Circuit, 
may illustrate those dynamics. 67 The Commission might also keep in mind 
certain boundary-alteration criteria-that appeals courts should include three 
or more jurisdictions, states which are adjacent and jurisdictions that have 
diverse populations, legal business and socioeconomic interests-which the 
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (the Hruska 
Commission) articulated in 1973 and remains salient today. 68 
These propositions mean that the Commission must emphasize boundary 
adjustments which will be most salutary, while the entity may want to 
consider those modifications in conjunction with other measures that would 
promote expeditious, effective and fair resolution but involve little detriment. 
More specifically, the Commission might scrutinize "minimalist" boundary 
changes which implicate, for example, the fewest federal districts or states or 
66. See supra notes 35, 40-42 and accompanying text. 
67. Smaller courts may better resolve cases, a view which finds some support in experience 
since the Fifth Circuit's 1980 division. See, e.g., Tjotlat, supra note 60, at 70-73; Eric J. Gribbin, 
Note, California Split: A Plan To Divide the Ninth Circuit, 47 DUKE L.J. 351, 381-82 (1997); 
Becker Letter, supra note 35, at 3. But see supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. Recent 
proposals to realign the Ninth Circuit would not have improved resolution in the new Ninth Circuit 
but might have done so in the new Twelfth Circuit while disrupting precedent and judicial 
administration. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text; infra notes 69-73 and accompanying 
text. 
68. See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System. The Geographical 
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223, 231-32 
(1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission]. 
1146 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
combine that approach and the structural and non-structural solutions 
examined earlier which have the greatest promise. 
1. The Ninth Circuit 
The analyses in the third part of this m1ss1ve and in the remainder of 
section four suggest that the Ninth Circuit promptly, efficaciously and 
equitably treats cases today, or that the application of many mechanisms 
apart from boundary alterations would enable it to do so. However, I 
concentrate on this court because the statute which authorized the 
Commission expressly mentions the circuit and the recent dispute over the 
court's division prompted establishment of the entity. Moreover, attempts to 
identify those adjustments in Ninth Circuit boundaries that would most 
improve resolution and impose minimal disadvantage could inform similar 
efforts to evaluate other appeals courts. 
Numerous concepts show that modifications of the Ninth Circuit's 
boundaries which Congress has considered or federal courts observers have 
recommended would be insufficiently effective to warrant adoption. The 
aforementioned general propositions involving the disruption of precedent 
and judicial administration apply to the Ninth Circuit. 69 For instance, 
bifurcation may foster inconsistent enforcement of the law that governs 
maritime matters, commerce and utilities in the two new courts along the 
West Coast, complicating economic activities and forcing attorneys to 
research the case precedent of both tribunals for possible cross-circuit 
transactions. 70 A split of the court could concomitantly lead to conflicting 
interpretations of federal statutes which cover the environment and in 
additional areas that the Ninth Circuit has uniformly applied throughout the 
West. 71 Division might also promote forum shopping by litigants and 
counsel, while it may undermine the appellate courts' federalizing function 
and could limit intercircuit consistency. 72 Moreover, bifurcation would 
69. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
70. See Hug, supra note 14, at 39; J. Clifford Wallace, Statement to the Commission on 
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 5 (Apr. 3, 1998) (visited Nov. 8, 1998) 
< hup://app.comm. uscourts.gov/hearings/chicago/wallace.htm > [hereinafter Wallace Statement]. 
Of course, this situation now pertains to the East and Gulf Coasts. 
71. See Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, !Olst Cong. 286-87 (1990) (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson); id. at 508 
(statement of Michael Traynor); Schwarzer Statement, supra note 16, at 3. 
72. See Gribbin, supra note 67, at 392; Wallace Statement, supra note 70, at 5; supra note 42 
and accompanying text. 
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necessitate duplicative administration and might reduce the diversity of each 
court. 73 
Even were restructuring less disruptive and more efficacious, the Ninth 
Circuit resists felicitous reconfiguration. The principal explanation for this 
circumstance is that California has a gigantic population base, which 
generates a majority of the court's appeals and comprises four federal 
districts. Congress and many observers of the Ninth Circuit and the federal 
courts have found it inadvisable to institute the unprecedented actions of 
creating a one-state circuit or of placing California's districts in two appellate 
courts, the options for addressing the jurisdiction which have received the 
greatest consideration. 
California might become a circuit by itself, perhaps with several judges in 
addition to those presently stationed there, so that the court could better 
resolve the large number of cases that the state produces. However, a 
single-jurisdiction circuit may lack the diversity of backgrounds which 
judges who have practiced and lived in different states offer. 74 Moreover, 
one senator having long tenure might influence too substantially the court's 
appointments and, thus, could mold the circuit for a generation. 75 Splitting 
California and assigning the jurisdiction's four federal districts to different 
appeals courts may correspondingly foster different interpretations of 
California substantive law which apply within the state. 76 These difficulties 
mean that neither major method of treating California has garnered much 
support, particularly in Congress. 
Other Ninth Circuit realignments which respond less directly to California 
and which senators and representatives have evaluated and federal courts 
observers have proposed appear comparatively inefficacious. Several 
alternatives that Congress has seriously considered would not effectively 
distribute the circuit caseload and active judges or might contravene 
applicable criteria for boundary alteration, such as the standards which the 
Hruska Commission enunciated. 77 For instance, proposals to create an 
appeals court constituting the five jurisdictions of the Pacific Northwest 
would have allocated the docket and judgeships in an unbalanced manner. 78 
73. See Schwarzer Statement, supra note 16, at 3; Tobias, supra note 14, at 241 n.307. 
74. See Hruska Commission, supra note 68, at 237; Wallace Statement, supra note 70, at 5. 
75. See Hruska Commission, supra note 68, at 237; see also Gribbin, supra note 67, at 384. 
California is obviously quite diverse. 
76. See Hruska Commission, supra note 68, at 238-39. But see O'Scannlain Statement, supra 
note 49, at 5-6; cf. Becker Letter, supra note 35, at 3 (suggesting California's recently-instituted 
certification procedure would ameliorate problem). 
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
78. See, e.g., S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 948, lOlst Cong. (1990); see also supra notes 
31-32 and accompanying text. 
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An analogous suggestion included Arizona with these states; however, this 
composition would have minimally ameliorated the uneven caseload and 
would. have violated the idea of contiguity. 79 
Additional possibilities deserve little assessment because they seem even 
more;·impracticable. For example, trifurcation would disrupt precedent and 
judicial administration while requiring unnecessary, new expenditures, such 
as the costs of redundant court staff and administrative structures. 80 The 
notion of transferring jurisdictions-namely Arizona, Idaho and Montana, 
which are currently in the Ninth Circuit-to the adjacent courts of the Eighth 
or Tenth Circuits would concomitantl( disturb multiple appellate courts and 
federal districts and impose expense.8 In short, the Commission could well 
conclude that the Ninth Circuit, principally because of the conundrum 
presented by California, defies efficacious restructuring. 82 
2. The Ninth and Other Circuits 
Several provocative recommendations which Third Circuit Chief Judge 
Edward Becker recently provided the Commission correspondingly illustrate 
the application of the above general approach to the Ninth Circuit, other 
appeals courts and the system. 83 Chief Judge Becker proposed that the 
Commission evaluate the prospect of moving Arizona, Idaho and Montana 
from the Ninth to the Tenth Circuit. However, the earlier analysis indicates 
that neither appellate court seems to be resolving cases slowly, ineffectively 
and unfairly8 and, even if one were, Chief Judge Becker's suggestion is less 
workable than numerous limited, circuit-specific measures. His 
recommendation could detrimentally affect two appeals courts and three 
federal districts, primarily by disrupting precedent and judicial 
79. See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Gribbin, 
supra note 67, at 385-87; supra notes 39-41, 68 and accompanying text. 
80. See O'Scannlain Statement, supra note 49, at 7; see also supra note 73 and accompanying 
text. 
81. See Hruska Commission, supra note 68, at 236-37; Tobias, supra note 14, at 245. 
82. For analysis of additional problems that could attend the Ninth Circuit's division, see Carl 
Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV. 583, 596 (1997); Hug, 
supra note 14, at 41; Tobias, supra note 14, at 241-42. But see Gribbin, supra note 67, at 389-91. 
83. See Becker Letter, supra note 35, at 3-5; see also supra pages 19-20 (affording general 
approach). The proposals illustrate the approach by way of comparison. 
84. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. 
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administration, 85 and would apparently decrease the diversity of both 
appellate tribunals. 86 
What Chief Judge Becker characterized as the "small workload" of the 
D.C. Circu~t led him to tender the "dr?ma~ic"8,Proposa.J t?at this court ~e 
"merged with the Fourth or Federal Circmt." The JUnst supported his 
suggestion by acknowledging that the court's "administrative Jaw caseload is 
celebrated, but [asserting that] all the circuits have those cases, if in smaller 
numbers, and the D.C. Circuit also has many drug and sentencing cases, just 
like the other circuits. "88 This approach, which Chief Judge Becker 
premised on a Judicial Conference recommendation in its Long Range Plan 
that workloads be "equalized among judges of the courts of appeals 
nationally, "89 arguably misconceives the relevant inquiry. The Commission 
should consider proposing boundary changes only after it has definitively 
identified slow, ineffective and unfair appellate resolution and has exhausted 
many other options. Nevertheless, once the Commission allows for the 
complexity of the D.C. Circuit's docket, which the enormous records 
underlying challenges to federal agency decisions typify, the entity may 
ascertain that the court's workload is so insubstantial as to suggest delayed, 
inefficacious and inequitable disposition. Should the Commission reach this 
determination, it might find relatively modest solutions, such as reductions in 
the circuit's authorized judgeships, to be less disruptive and, thus, superior. 90 
Even if the Commission concludes that the situation resists remediation 
with measures which are more moderate than boundary-alteration, the entity 
could decide that approaches different from the one recommended by Chief 
Judge Becker would prove rather salutary in part because they would disturb 
less significantly the three courts' precedent, judicial administration, and 
traditions. After all, the D.C. Circuit is the preeminent court for reviewing 
appeals of agency decisionmaking, which comprise half of the circuit's 
caseload, while the court's judges often possess substantial understanding of 
administrative law, practice, procedure and policy.91 The Federal Circuit 
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Moreover, the recommendation would 
minimally ameliorate the impact of the large Ninth Circuit caseload. 
87. Becker Letter, supra note 35. at 4. 
88. Id. 
89. Id.; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 45. 
90. The Republican Senate has partly effected this idea by not filling a vacancy in one of the 
court's twelve positions. See, e.g .. 143 CONG. REC. S2515-S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); Neil 
A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 30. 
91. See, e.g .. Spottswood W. Robinson, III, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of Change, 55 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 715, 716-17 (1987); Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 159, 174-75 (1993). It is also the "least regional" of the regional circuits. 
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concomitantly has national subject matter jurisdiction over narrow, technical 
fields, and the court's members frequently have specialized expertise, 
particularly involving science and technology. 92 
Should the Commission definitively determine that the Fourth Circuit is 
not · expeditiously, effectively and fairly resolving appeals, that the 
authorization of a few judgeships for the court or other limited, circuit-
specific solutions would be inadequate and that boundary modifications are 
preferable, the entity might entertain the prospect of transferring Maryland 
from the Fourth to the Third Circuit. This realignment would affect only one 
jurisdiction, which is a single-district state and which is contiguous to the 
Third Circuit, and it would distribute the caseloads of the two appeals courts 
more evenly. 93 
In short, Chief Judge Becker has formulated several thought-provoking 
proposals. Unfortunately, those propositions seem unlikely to improve the 
situations of the regional circuits for which he posits suggestions or of the 
appellate system. However, his recommendations trenchantly illustrate the 
need for the Commission to exercise caution when proposing change in the 
appeals courts that have served the nation so well for more than a century. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 
of Appeals implements the suggestions afforded above, the entity can comply 
with the congressional mandate and complete its substantial task in the 
limited time which is available. These recommendations should enable the 
Commission to ascertain whether any regional circuits are not deciding cases 
promptly, efficaciously and equitably now and, if the entity so determines, to 
propose measures that will facilitate expeditious, effective and fair 
resolution. Best of luck in this endeavor, which is critical to the future of the 
federal appellate courts. 
92. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. It is not even considered a regional circuit. 
93. See Terminated Cases, supra note 15. The transfer would disturb two circuits but is less 
disruptive than merging the Federal or D.C. Circuits. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits warrant minimal analysis. The evaluation above suggests that 
neither court may promptly, efficaciously and equitably treat cases today. See supra notes 15-19, 67 
and accompanying text. However, controversy over, and inability to resolve, this issue and the two 
courts' relatively recent creation mean that they and Congress might resist realignment. 
